Race and Recruitment: Civil War History Readers, Vol. 2

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Contents

  1. Race and Recruitment: Civil War History Readers, Vol. 2
  2. Race and Recruitment
  3. The Historian's Use of Sectionalism and Vice Versa
  4. Kent State University Press Civil War Catalog by Kent State University Press - Issuu

Most were, to one degree or another, secessionist. Ridley was confident that the arms could be requisitioned in Los Angeles, [xvi] even though it was generally known that secessionists led the Mounted Rifles. Henry Hamilton, publisher of the Star, actively fostered the spirit of disloyalty in Los Angeles. In February , Hamilton had suggested that disunion should lead to an impossible compromise. Southern rights necessarily included the right to own human property, which Hamilton defended as fundamental to the principles of the Constitution. As John W.

He denounced Republicans, unionist Democrats, and anyone who sought to abolish slavery. He would, the following year, describe the Civil War explicitly as a race war. Hamilton was not alone. Edward Kewen [xxi] , a nativist and white supremacist, had given rousing speeches before cheering Los Angeles audiences in the weeks leading up to the election. Senator, Milton Latham.

Race and Recruitment: Civil War History Readers, Vol. 2

Democrats in the pro-secession Breckenridge Club had met in front of the Montgomery Saloon in Los Angeles every Tuesday evening before the election, often to hear Kewen speak, followed by a torchlight procession up Main Street to the old Plaza. Union men increasingly felt intimidated. Both secessionists and Union men in Los Angeles expected California to be dramatically changed by the onrush of events following the fall of Fort Sumter. What form that change would take remained unclear. Legislation to divide the state into northern and southern territories had gone to Congress two years before, but Congressional action was unlikely.

Joining the entire state to the Confederacy was unlikely, but Southern California might be annexed to the Confederate States, if momentum toward secession could be maintained. Johnston left San Francisco on April 25 after resigning his commission. Although a committed secessionist, Johnston was a thorough soldier. In Los Angeles, Hancock had literally circled the wagons in anticipation of a raid on his store of arms.

There was little he could do now but observe, report to Sumner, and wait. On April 29, Sumner wrote the War Department: [xxix]. In support of the troop movements, Hancock set two wagon trains in motion to collect stores from both forts, but it would take weeks. Until federal troops arrived, Hancock and his store of arms remained at risk. If Hancock were to be driven from his post, secession would have had its first victory in separating Southern California from the Union. Both Sumner and Hancock had to consider the implications of A.

Griffin, in Los Angeles. Rowdies in El Monte and San Bernardino had already begun to parade the bear flag of the California Republic, now taken to be a symbol of secession. Hancock had learned that a group of 50 or more riders planned to meet at the Plaza and raise the flag of secession over the county courthouse. And would that end, after drinks at the Bella Union, with stripping the Army depot of its guns and ammunition? But a different plot was underway.

The secessionist leaders of the Los Angeles Mounted Rifles worried that an assault on Hancock would put their own plan at risk. They now intended to slip out of the county, cross the Colorado River at Yuma, disappear into the disputed Arizona territory, and make their way to Texas and the Confederate States.

Carleton named the site Camp Fitzgerald. Hancock, his wife, and the Army supplies were safe. The moment had passed when secessionists might have raised a force of several hundred from El Monte, San Bernardino, and among the Californios in Los Angeles. Hancock was ordered to active service in the East and eventually to become a Union hero at Gettysburg.

And Henry Hamilton would continue to publish anti-Lincoln editorials in the Star until he was elected to the state Legislature.


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Johnston, along with the most ardent secessionists among the Mounted Rifles, quietly left Los Angeles on June 16, crossed into Arizona, and with the help of secessionists there joined the Confederate States army. Jefferson Davis made Johnston the second-ranking general of the Confederate Army. He died early in the war at the battle of Shiloh, Alonzo Ridley by his side.

George Gift, who had presided over the original mustering of the Mounted Rifles, became a Confederate naval officer. Joseph Brent found his own way to the Confederate States, ultimately becoming an army brigade commander. That leading men in Los Angeles remained openly secessionist for so long and that so many Confederate volunteers passed through the city at the start of the war troubled Unionists then and those who wrote about the Civil War in its immediate aftermath.

After taking an oath of loyalty that he regarded as meaningless, King was released, as every man arrested in Los Angeles for treasonable activity during the Civil War would be. When the war ended, former Undersheriff Alonzo Ridley joined another dubious cause and died fighting for Emperor Maximilian in Mexico. Edward Kewen, white supremacist and former state legislator, was now willing to accept that African Americans had some civil rights. Potts, Five days later, Governor Milton Latham resigned after being elected by the state legislature to fill the vacancy left by the death of US Senator David C.

Race and Recruitment

Downey assumed the governorship on January 14, He resigned on April 9, , when his adopted home state of Texas seceded. According to his wife, writing many years later. Rockwell D. Hunt Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, , Congressman Charles Scott echoed Burch a few days later in the same newspaper. Hancock was referring to a small cannon that County Sheriff Sanchez had been keeping unaccountably, it seems at the county jail along with other arms. By February , Confederate units had nearly reached the Colorado River.

We are dedicated to providing you with articles like this one. Show your support with a tax-deductible contribution to KCET. After all, public media is meant for the public. It belongs to all of us. Officials at the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Civilian Oversight Committee abruptly ended their meeting without discussing anything on the agenda when supporters of President Trump's policies clashed with members of Black Lives Matter and other groups.

With the growth of factories and the demand for unskilled labor, immigrants, primarily young men in the working years, continued to be the ideal source of labor. Immigrants were generally more willing to accept lower wages and inferior working conditions than native born workers Zolberg : Great efficiencies in production led to higher profits that could be reinvested in new technology, which led to even more production and eventually higher wages for workers.

Although the demand for manufactured goods gradually grew to encompass the entire country, the initial demand was from the urban population. Unlike farm families that were largely self sufficient in food and made most of their clothing, urban families needed to purchase everything in the market. The large and growing urban populations, primarily fueled by immigration throughout the second half of the 19 th century and the first two decades of the 20 th century, created a huge demand for the increased production of the emerging industrial sector.

Carter and Sutch : — claim that economies of scale in demand and production also stimulated inventive activity and the diffusion of technological knowledge and innovation. In his analysis of long swings, or Kuznets cycles, Easterlin found that immigration and population growth and subsequent family formation stimulated economic growth through increasing demand for housing, urban development, and other amenities.

In the post World War II era, the federal government assumed more responsibility for maintaining aggregate demand regardless of population dynamics. If capital is fixed, additional immigrant labor would lead to lowered productivity as capital stocks are spread more thinly and as less capital is invested per worker capital dilution.

However, there is some evidence that capital follows the international movements of labor, especially in labor scarce economies Hatton and Williamson : — In addition to international capital flows, immigrants are thought to save a higher proportion of their incomes than native born workers. Much of this savings is remitted to family and kin in their countries of origin, but there is also evidence that immigrants purchase homes, open small businesses and invest heavily in the education of their children. These claims suggest that immigrants contribute to economic growth by increasing the supply of or attracting capital as well as the supply of labor.

Rosenberg : 32—33 concludes that immigrants to the United States also brought European technology that increased the productivity of American industry. Carter and Sutch : review the historical evidence on the debate over immigration and capital dilution at the turn of the 20 th century, with a focus on the claim that immigrants increased the returns to capital and hence capitalists , but harmed the economic fortunes of native born workers. They conclude that the division between capital and labor was not as clear cut as many assume.

A substantial share of American workers owned capital through home ownership and as operators of farms and small shops. About half of American households in might have been considered as equity investors through their ownership of insurance policies that were self-financed pensions Ranson and Sutch cited in Carter and Sutch : The IPUMS files are created by extracting samples of household records and all persons in sampled households from the original manuscript microfilm records. The samples of the IPUMS census files are sufficiently large to reproduce, within the range of sampling error, published figures in the original census reports.

Moreover, the IPUMS files, with complete individual and family unit records, can be recoded and tabulated, limited only by the scope and detail of the original census questions and classifications. In addition to the standard census variables, the IPUMS files also contain many new recoded variables to facilitate comparisons across censuses Sobek Although the classification of workers by industrial sectors is sometimes conflated with occupations, these two dimensions of work are conceptually distinct. Industries refer to product produced or service delivered by a firm or family run enterprise while occupations refer to actual work activities and skills of workers Sobek , Sutch There is overlap in some categories — most farmers occupations work in the agricultural sector, but there are significant differences in the wide range of occupations e.

The process of industrialization is associated with industrial restructuring as well as changes in the skills and actual tasks performed by workers. We focus on the shifts in the industrial distribution of workers because technological and organizational change typically results in the origin, growth, decline, and disappearance of businesses and forms of production. As agricultural productivity increased, workers were drawn into manufacturing and services. Shifts in occupations and the division of labor are likely to be derivative of the changes in industrial structure and technological change.

As factories replaced farms the prototypical shift in the organization of work , many new occupations were created. Aside from the link to industrial structure, there is less theoretical clarity in the expected changes in occupations with industrialization. A widespread assumption is that technological change leads to an upgrading of occupational skills. However, early mass production probably led to a replacement of skilled craft workers with unskilled production workers.

Goldin and Katz argue that this process was reversed in the years around World War I when technological change may have had a pro skill bias. Regardless of changes in the content of nonfarm occupations, the shift from farming to factory work was probably not considered as a step upward, or to a more technologically challenging job, by farmers. With our focus on industrial sectors, we attempt to capture the direct impact of industrialization on the structure of the labor force without additional assumptions of the skill levels or status of workers.

The industry question was first asked in the census. For prior censuses, IND was inferred from responses to the census question on occupations. The classification includes some detailed industries that emerged from technological change over time. Any study of industrial change must attempt to reconcile the need for detail revealed by the tertiary level categories with the need for parsimony evident in the broader categories. The summary industrial classification used here is ad hoc, reflecting elements of both principles with the objective of understanding the creation and expansion of specialized industries during the Age of Industrialization.

The other primary sectors are subdivided into their detailed tertiary industries, though quite a few of the detailed categories have been aggregated. Our final classification is displayed in Appendix 1. Our first objective is to describe changes in the industrial structure of the gainful workforce from to , and the share of recent immigrants and their descendents in this industrial transformation. Figure 1 shows the dramatic changes in the structure of the workforce in and for the 9 major industrial sectors. There are also significant increases in the proportions working in mining, transportation and utilities, trade, producer services and social services.

There was relative stability from 4. The source percentages in Figure 1 are presented for detailed industry categories in the first two columns in Table 1 , which provides an overview of the growth and transformation of the American workforce from to Columns 3 and 4 show the absolute and relative growth of workers in each industry over the forty years. Columns 5 and 6 show the immigrant share both first and second generation of each industrial sector. The final column shows the ratio of the growth of immigrant workers to the overall growth or decline of workers in each industry from to Percent Immigrant first and second generation of Workers, by Industrial Sector in Accordingly, we refer to the gainful working population as the workforce, which does not connote the precision of the modern labor force concept and measurement.

Rapid growth and structural transformation are the two major trends in the American workforce from to The number of gainful workers in the United States more than doubled from to A relative growth index value of 1. A value of less than 1. In , at the eve of the age of mass migration and when almost half of the workforce was in the agricultural sector, immigrants and their children comprised about one-third of all workers. We include the second generation the children of immigrants as part of the immigrant community because they are reared and socialized by their foreign born parents and would not have been in the United States except for the migration of their parents.

Almost half of the total growth of 22 million workers from to can be attributed to the increase of first and second generation immigrant workers the last column of Table 1. In the early 19 th century, upwards of two-thirds of the working population was employed in agriculture Taeuber and Taeuber : At the turn of the twentieth century, nearly two-thirds of Americans lived on farms or in villages and towns of less than five thousand residents Katz and Stern : 8. Throughout the 19 th century, government priorities and spending reflected the dominance of rural and agricultural interests.

One of the landmark expansions of the federal government was the Morrill Act of , which created the Department of Agriculture and authorized the founding of land grant colleges Carter et al. From to , agriculture added 2. By , only one in four American workers remained in agriculture, and the American economy was increasingly centered in urban factories and offices rather than on farms. Although many immigrants were drawn to the agricultural frontier in the 18 th and 19 th centuries, only one of every five farmers was an immigrant or the child of an immigrant during the age of mass immigration from to The largest shift in the American workforce from to was the expansion of manufacturing employment from 14 to almost 25 percent of the workforce.

If mining and construction were combined with manufacturing, one-third of Americans were industrial workers in Manufacturing employment grew more than twice as fast as the workforce as a whole from to In absolute terms, the manufacturing sector expanded from 2. Within the manufacturing sector, the largest increases were registered in metals iron and steel , which grew from 1. Closely related to this was the expansion of coal mining used to produce steel from 0.

More than one out of ten workers in the American economy in were producing steel, extracting the raw materials used to produce steel, or making machinery from steel e. Another important shift was the rise in apparel clothing manufacturing from 0. In the early 20 th century, American women and men were able for the first time to buy inexpensive manufactured ready made dresses, shirts, and suits, and there was less dependence on home made and hand tailored clothing.

With less expensive ready made clothing, fashions changed as well. Men and women replaced simple cloaks with fitted coats Cahan The rapid growth of manufacturing from to relied heavily on immigrant labor. More than one-half of the net growth of 7. The immigrant share was significant in all manufacturing industries, but proportionally less in wood and mineral products and a few other categories.

Immigrants provided the majority of added workers in the rapidly growing iron and steel industry, machinery manufacturing, and textiles and apparel. The dominance of the Eastern European immigrants in apparel manufacture and trade in New York City is well known Kahan , but immigrants were also over-represented in mining and construction and throughout the heavy industries in the Northeast and Midwest. The consequences of expansion in the manufacturing sector rippled through other sectors.

This led to major changes in the organization of the economy and the structure of employment. The distribution of goods from manufacturing plants to households also required massive investments and expansion in transportation, communications, retailing, and a supportive institutional structure for the expansion of business, and an increasingly urban society.

A governmental bureaucracy was needed to build roads, manage cities, and to educate the population for employment in factories and offices. The transportation and communication sector added more than 2. The telegraph was the only means of rapid long-distance communication in and the small number of workers employed in the sector about 27, reflected the limited role of long distance communications there were an additional 26, workers employed in postal services.

By , a brand new communications industry—the telephone—grew from zero to , workers or about 0. Immigrants played an important role in the growing transportation and communications sector, but their role was secondary to the 3 rd and higher generation population—the NBNP Native Born of Native Parentage population. For example, nearly two-thirds of the added workers in railroads were 3 rd and higher generation Americans. There was a great boom in railroad construction in late 19 th century America.

The geographic dispersion of railroads, and relatively good wages in the industry, undoubtedly pulled many descendents of the native born workers into the railroad sector. Wholesale trade added almost , workers from to , and retail trade grew by almost 2. One of every eight American workers in was employed in retail or wholesale trade—about one-half of the size of the manufacturing sector.

The late 19 th century witnessed the beginnings of mass retailing and the emergence of department stores in large cities Ward : 94; Raff : 4— Although most studies in the business literature focus on larger firms, most retail enterprises were probably small family owned stores. As late as , the number of proprietors in retail sales was approximately equal to the number of employees in the sector Carter et al. The rapid growth of workers in sales were most likely employed in very small shops or as peddlers who sold goods to farm families and other households in scattered rural communities.

The availability of new manufactured goods, linked by an expanding transportation system and a network of wholesale and retail enterprises, created a national market for consumer goods that would gradually supplant home production. Immigrants, especially the second generation, provided for about half of the added workers in trade from to , primarily in general merchandise, food, and apparel stores.

Immigrant merchants were often reputed to create new markets through peddling goods to remote regions and in extending credit to people without accumulated savings. The very heterogeneous collection of service industries is reorganized here to emphasize the key distinctions between producer, personal, and social services Singlemann Producer services include banking, insurance, real estate, accounting, and other business services that play an important intermediary role in urban and industrial economies. Social services include education, health care, public administration, and other services that are generated by the government to meet the collective needs of communities and individuals.

Personal services is the residual category and corresponds most closely to the image of service occupations, and it includes private household workers, dressmakers, and shoe repair shops. This sector also includes repair services including auto repair , and entertainment services including movie theaters and recreation. There is a certain amount of arbitrariness in all industrial classifications, including this one. Hotels and lodging places are classified as a personal service, but eating and drinking establishments are considered as part of the retail trade sector.

Concurrent with the creation of an industrial society from to was the expansion of business and the beginnings of public provision of education, health care, and welfare — these are evident in the increases of workers in producer services and social services.

As business and social services expanded from to , personal services declined. Producer services grew almost 4 times as fast as the overall workforce from to , and more than doubled their relative share from 1. The largest components of the increase in producer services were in banking, insurance, real estate, and related business services Ward : The absolute number of workers in these business industries is small, but rapid expansion reflects the increasing complexity of an industrial economy. The efficient management and coordination of large firms and corporations required a growing army of accountants, bookkeepers, and other office personnel.

The relative growth of social services from 3. The expansion of government services was shaped by the increasing urbanization of the population. The concentration of people in cities made it easier to provide proximate access to schooling, health care, and other services including transportation, sanitation, and public safety. Custom, kinship networks, and voluntary associations are often sufficient to satisfy collective welfare needs in low density settlements and rural areas, but the growth of government appears to be an inevitable concomitant of an urban and industrial society.

Government employment grew from 3 to 5 times faster than the workforce as a whole. As the new service industries, including education, government employment, and business services, grew from to , the second generation participated proportional to their numbers, but 3 rd and higher generation Americans were the majority of added workers. This was particularly true in social service fields such as health, education, the post office, and government employment more generally. By and large, these were good jobs that required educational credentials and social capital, which immigrants were much less likely to possess.

The growth of professional employment in the service economy was a natural accompaniment of the expansion and development. Although new immigrants were ahead of African Americans in most labor queues, the growth of the overall labor market through immigration created demand for managerial, professional, and clerical employment that was more likely to be filled by older stock white Americans than by immigrants or African Americans. The underlying question that motivates this analysis is the impact of immigration on the transformation of the American economy from a primarily agrarian structure to one based on manufacturing and associated industries.

Would it have been possible to have had the American industrial revolution without immigrants? Or alternatively, would the industrial revolution have been smaller, slower, or more costly? In the prior section, we focused on the magnitude and economic roles of the first and second generation immigrant population.

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In this section, we extend the analysis with an estimate of magnitude of 3 rd generation immigrants—the grandchildren of immigrants and their economic roles. The grandchildren of immigrants are unlikely to have attachments to their ancestral homeland and are probably well assimilated into American society. If we desire to attribute the 3 rd generation as part of the immigrant contribution, the skeptical reader may wonder why we do not also count the 4 th and higher generations as also part of the immigrant share.

Our claim is that 3 rd generation immigrants in the early 20 th century are the recent descendants of European immigrants who were more likely to have settled in cities than to have moved to the agricultural frontier. In , one-third of all workers were composed of first and second generation immigrants and most lived in cities.

We assume that 3 rd generation immigrants were much more likely to have been exposed to emerging opportunities in the urban industrial economy than older stock native born Americans in the late 19 th and early 20 th century. There are two components to estimate: immigration generations and the industrial structure by immigrant generation.

We first address the measurement of immigration generations. The work force can be divided into two components: immigrants counting both the foreign born and the second generation and the native born of native parentage NBNP. Although the NBNP population is typically assumed to reflect a society without immigration, the distinction between the immigrant and NBNP populations is not fixed, since the 3 rd and higher order generation descendents of immigrants are counted as part of the native born population. Since immigrants were disproportionately living in cities and held industrial jobs in , it seems plausible to assume that their grandchildren are probably over-represented in industrial employment in relative to the grandchildren of the NBNP Population.

The logic of our analytical approach is diagrammed in Figure 2. The two columns represent the and work force by immigrant generation. In both years, we can measure only three generational groupings: 1 the foreign born, 2 the second generation—the children of immigrants, and 3 third and higher generations—NBNP. The workforce is composed of some workers those age 20 in would be age 60 in , the descendants of the population, and recent immigrants and their descendants.

It is impossible to make precise estimates of generational continuity and succession because of the complexity of demographic structure and changes, including variations in age structure, labor force exits and entries, mortality, and differential fertility Duncan a. Although most workers in would have retired or died before , some are still working. Nonetheless, we can provide a crude estimate of the contribution of recent immigration to the workforce with several simplifying assumptions. The first assumption is that the majority of the first and second generation workers in were recent immigrants.

Some of these immigrants or their parents may well have arrived before The estimation of the third generation requires even more heroic assumptions about the fraction of the third and higher generation workers NBNP that are descendents of immigrants in The analytical task is illustrated in Figure 2 , by the dashed line that identifies the 3 rd generation from the broader category of the 3 rd and higher generation population.

To do this, we assume that the ratio of the 3 rd generation population grandchildren of immigrants to the 3 rd and higher generation population in is proportional to the ratio of the 2 nd generation to the 2 nd and higher generation population in We have three of the four numbers in this equation 2 nd generation, 2 nd and higher generations, and 3 rd and higher generation populations , and it is straightforward to estimate the missing element—the 3 rd generation.

This equation assumes that the relative magnitude of 3 rd generation is roughly comparable to the descendents of the 2 nd generation. The demographic metabolism that leads to generational replacement over time is exceedingly complex, and our simple model does not directly measure these processes for more discussion, see Blau and Duncan : Our estimation rests on an assumption about proportionality—that the 2 nd generation relative to the 2 nd and higher generational total is proportional to the 3 rd generation relative to the 3 rd and higher generational total.

One virtue of this assumption is its transparency — it does not specify demographic mechanisms, but simply assumes that generational replacement over a 40 year period from all mechanisms is roughly proportional to the initial generational composition. The next step is to measure the industrial composition of the labor force within each immigrant generation: 1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , and 4 th and higher. The Shift-Share model is often used to measure the expected changes in a subset of the population state or locality by assuming that change share is proportional to the change in the total population national.

The difference between the expected distribution and the actual distribution for the local area is a residual shift that is due to local factors that are independent of the national trend. In this analysis, we first estimate an expected distribution by industry assuming that the growth rate of workers in each industry from to is equal to the national growth rate of the workforce.

The next step is to measure the difference between the expected and actual workers in each industry. The logic of the estimation of these two components of industrial transformation—Continuity and Shifts—is diagramed in Figure 3. Specifically, we assume that The multiplication of this ratio approximately 1. The overall natural growth rate is assumed to be equivalent for the 3 rd generation population and the 4 th and higher generation population. The expected distributions of the labor force by industry and generation from to assume continuity— workers followed their parents or grandparents in the same industries.

This assumes that skills, preferences, and informal mechanisms of recruitment are passed along across generations. As measured by the index of dissimilarity, the industrial structure of the first generation is more similar to that of the second generation than to the 3 rd and higher generations. Of course, workers change employment from time to time, and children do not always follow in the same line of work as their parents.

The Historian's Use of Sectionalism and Vice Versa

The forces of supply and demand, technological change, and other market forces create pressures to which workers must respond. The next step is to allocate the Shifts between industries to the 3 rd generation and the 4 th and higher generations in The overall Shift for the 3 rd and higher generations in is distributed proportional to the relative size of the generations. The results of this simple estimation of Continuity and Shifts are show in Table 2.

The generational compostion of each industrial sector is estimated in two steps:. The expected workers are distributed proportionally to the generations of 3rd and higher and 2nd. Column 1 through 4 in Table 2 show the workforce by industrial sector for all workers and for each immigrant generation 3 rd and higher, 2 nd , and 1 st. The next two columns show the estimated workforce for the 4 th and higher and the 3 rd generations by industry in , assuming intergenerational continuity.

The next columns show net shifts, or the differences between the actual and expected workforce by industry, for the same immigrant generations. There were a little more than 10 million workers in manufacturing in —about one quarter of the total workforce. The next three columns show the absolute number of workers in each industry by generation in First and second generation immigrants comprised 2. This figure, as large as it is, is an underestimate of the contribution of immigration to the manufacturing sector in Some of the immigrants and their descendents are included in the 1 st and 2 nd generation in , but many others have been absorbed into the NBNP 3 rd and higher generation.

A shorthand designation of these calculations is that the expected 4 th and higher workers are the descendents of the 3 rd and higher generation workers and the expected 3 rd generation are the descendents of the 2 nd generation. However, descendents is only an approximate term, since there are multiple demographic mechanisms that might be responsible for the replacement of the workforce by workers in , including some individuals who are in the workforce at both time points.

The expected generational figures in each industry are generated by an assumption of intergenerational continuity whereby each generation follows their parents or grandparents in the same sector of the economy. The measurement of this process is generated by the assumption of proportionality—workers in by generation were distributed by industrial sector in similar proportions to the prior generation in The next two columns, 7 and 8, in Table 2 show the net Shifts for the 4 th and higher and the 3 rd generations between the actual and expected numbers in workforce by industry.

Although we have only the actual workforce for the 3 rd and higher generation, we can estimate shifts for the 4 th and higher and the 3 rd generation in , by assuming proportionality with the generational composition the 3 rd and higher generation and the 2 nd generation. These estimates are combined in columns 9, 10, and 11, which show the percentage of workers in each industry that can be attributed to 1 st and 2 nd generation workers, 3 rd generation continuity, and 3 rd generation shift. These three components are totaled in column 12 to show our estimates of the share of workers that might be thought to be the result of recent immigration.

The results of this exercise are summarized in Figure 4 , which shows the composition of the 9 major industrial sectors in by immigrant generation. These estimates suggest that over two-thirds of manufacturing workers in are immigrants or the descendents of recent immigrants. Most farmers in were the descendents of old stock Americans. Of the 10 million agricultural workers in , only a quarter was first or second generation immigrants. There was a substantial exodus out of farming—the shift-share model estimates that 4 million 4 th or higher generation NBNP descendants of farmers were working in some other sector in The estimates and assumptions in Table 2 , show that all of the native born NBNP increase in mining is composed of the grandchildren of immigrants.

This is also true of many other sectors in which it appears that the immigrant share declined from to , such as railroad workers. Note, however, that the workforce in the new petroleum and natural gas industry was disproportionately composed of 4 th and higher generation Americans. As noted earlier, almost 7 in 10 workers in manufacturing in were 1 st , 2 nd or 3 rd generation immigrants.

This was particularly true in the growth sectors of iron and steel, machinery but only one half of workers in the new motor vehicle industry , meat packing, and textiles and apparel. More than one half of railroad workers in had some foreign roots as did two thirds of workers in retail sales.

Although the addition of the 3 rd generation increases the participation of recent immigrants to the service sector, the role of immigrants in many of the relatively good jobs in teaching, health, the post office, and other government services is much lower than in manufacturing and other sectors with less desirable jobs. By virtue of their education and social connections, the descendents of long resident Americans had a leg up on entry into many of the better jobs in To the extent that there are differential intergenerational transition rates because of proximity, ethnic recruitment, and discrimination, these figures underestimate the advantages of long resident Americans relative to newcomers.

Would native born workers have been more willing to enter the industrial sector had immigrant labor not been available? Although it is impossible to answer this question definitively, we can review the potential labor reserves and speculate about their likely responses based the extensive research literature on domestic migration patterns. The potential source of reserve labor in the United States in the late 19 th century and early 20 th century were the sons and daughters of small scale farmers in the Northeast, Midwest, and South. Many of these farms were relatively small and could barely support a family.

With a growing population, many of the second and third sons of independent farmers had to descend to the ranks of tenancy or farm laborer, secure funds to purchase a farm or marry a woman who was an heir to a farm , or seek their fortune elsewhere Wright Some segments of the rural population were worse off than others. Over the last half of the 19 th century, a large fraction of Southern white famers had lost their land, and became tenant sharecroppers growing cotton on marginal lands Raper and Reid , Newby Even more precarious was the situation of African American tenant farmers, whose plight was comparable to those of persecuted peasantry Raper In addition to the economic privations shared by white and black sharecroppers, African Americans encountered omnipresent racism and rising violence in the Jim Crow South.

Poverty, even abject poverty, is not always an impetus to long distance migration. The thresholds that break the bonds of place vary across time and place. Depravation creates push factors but knowledge of opportunities in other locations, cultural preferences, and the support of family and friends in destination areas are also important Massey et al. When mass migration from Europe was interrupted during World War I and then halted in the s, Southern blacks migrated in large numbers to become industrial laborers in Northern cities.

The African American Great Migration from the s through the s was an epochal movement Fligstein ; Tolnay The spread of the boll weevil and farm mechanization laid waste to even marginal employment in much of the rural South. There was a parallel trek of white workers from the South to northern cities Berry ; Gregory ; Kirby : Ch.


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The destinations and timing of these domestic migrations suggest that Southern born blacks and whites were a partial substitute for European immigrant labor in industrializing cities of the North. Collins concludes that mass migration from Europe delayed the migration of black workers from the South. The situation of white farmers outside the South, and their children, is more difficult to assess.

A common presumption is that farming was a preferred way of life and migration, especially to the city, was the last resort even for the landless children of farmers. This assumption seems to be consistent with evidence on migration patterns. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the majority of the farm origin population remained on farms or in rural small town areas as adults, though not necessarily in their exact place of origin Taeuber : Only a small percentage moved to large metropolitan cities. This preference for an agricultural way of life was grounded in the historical settlement of the United States.

Prior to the late 19 th century, cities were not engines of economic growth, but were primarily centers of commerce and administration and transportation hubs. Immigrants arrived in port cities, but most probably moved on as soon as they could. During the 18 th and the first half of the 19 th century, the shortage of land in eastern states impelled most immigrants as well as many of the children of older settlers to seek their fortunes on the American frontier, first in Appalachia, then in the Ohio Valley, and eventually in the Great Plains Ferrie : 1: As the Eastern seaboard was filled in—at least in terms of agriculture—the western frontier was the source of land for agricultural settlement by immigrants and native born Americans without an inheritance Atack, Bateman, and Parker The situation changed in the late 19 th century as most of the potential arable land on the American frontier was settled and the economic development of urban industries expanded employment opportunities in cities.

With the development of the modern industrial economy, cities offered expanded employment in factories, commerce, and in offices. For persons with the right set of education, skills, and ambitions, the urban economy offered opportunities for social mobility that was impossible in any other location. There is evidence that the well educated sons of farmers were able to find well paid jobs as teachers, clerks, merchants, and in the skilled trades Wright : But for most white Americans with limited skills and ambitions, it was not obvious that menial factory or office work in a city was a step up from living on a farm or in a small town.

Most factory jobs were probably not highly desirable. One study reported that the accident rate for non English-speaking workers in one steel mill was twice the average for all workers and that one quarter of all recent immigrant steel workers were injured or killed Brody : — Most historical and comparative studies conclude that the process of industrialization was a profoundly alienating experience for most workers Kerr et al. Factories that tried to impose industrial discipline were plagued by high rates of absenteeism and turnover. The children of farmers who left farming were disproportionately represented in the lower rungs of the occupational hierarchy Freedman and Freedman , Blau and Duncan : In addition to the loss of autonomy in factory employment, migrants from farm families had to give up the familiarity of family and friends and the economic security of food production.

If forced to migrate, many native born white Americans from rural or small towns may have preferred to seek their fortune in the West than to join the ranks of the urban proletariat in industrializing cities. In the late 19 th and early 20 th century long distance interstate migration was much more likely to lead to greater occupational mobility than short distance moves Ferrie : Similar patterns are also evident in Table 3 , which shows net lifetime migration of African Americans and of whites by nativity for each decade from to The rapidly expanding industrial economy of the North and Midwest drew disproportionately on immigrant labor and then on African American workers from the South.

From to , the population growth of the Northeast and Midwest included almost 14 million immigrants, but there was negative net migration of 2. Following the closing of the immigration door, more than 2.

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Source: Eldridge and Thomas. Tables 1. Examining these data, Hatton and Williamson : — conclude that the competition with immigrants for jobs lowered the wages of the native born or slowed their rate of increase and that native born workers were crowded-out from urban labor markets in the Northeast and Midwest.

Moreover, Carter and Sutch show that there is a positive correlation between the destinations of immigrants and native born workers from to Rural laborers, both native-born and from abroad, were responding to declining prospects in their places of origin and to the new opportunities in the same destinations. Many native born workers did go to the industrial cities, but many more sought their fortune in the West. The majority of immigrants, and the African Americans that followed them, settled in the industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest.